When it comes to questions of U.S. foreign policy—when it comes to questions of world affairs in general—there are certain people I always want to hear from. One of them is Nick Burns—R. Nicholas Burns—the veteran U.S. diplomat.
Let me quote from my introduction to this new Q&A:
He is what you might call a “generalist.” He has served in many capacities and many places. He has studied, and worked on, a wide range of issues.
When he was a new Foreign Service officer, he was in Africa and the Middle East. At the White House, he worked in Soviet, then Russian, affairs. He was State Department spokesman. He was ambassador to Greece, and ambassador to NATO. He was an undersecretary of state. Most recently—from 2022 to 2025—he was ambassador to China.
Before going to China, he taught at Harvard’s Kennedy School. Where he is once more.
In our Q&A, we range widely, with Burns speaking crisply and analytically and me kind of sputtering and emoting. But I very much enjoyed our conversation—and learned from it—and I believe others will too.
We talk about China: the government’s aims, the persecution of the Uyghurs, the shackling of Hong Kong, the fate of Taiwan.
We talk about Ukraine and Russia. And about NATO and Europe.
And, of course, we talk about the United States: our character, our choices.
Maybe I could paste a few samples, paraphrasing Mr. Burns. At the outset of our conversation, I ask whether China aspires to be a global hegemon, in addition to a regional one.
Burns:
I don’t think the Chinese, in their heart of hearts, believe that they can be the world’s greatest power in five to ten years. But I do think that’s an aspiration. You know, they’re very fixed on anniversaries. And 2049 will mark the centennial of the takeover of China by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party.
So, to be a global hegemon—or the global hegemon—by that year is one of the Party’s ambitions.
“But even sooner than that,” Burns continues, “there’s no question in my mind that China wishes to become—aims to become, is determined to become—the strongest power in the Indo-Pacific.” And “that means overtaking the United States.”
Charles Krauthammer used to say that decline is a choice—for us Americans, that is. Does Burns agree? Yes, “because there’s human agency,” he says, “and we determine, in a democracy, what our priorities are.”
At times, the United States has been outward-looking, and at other times, inward-looking. We had better be careful where, and how, we look.
Burns became U.S. ambassador to NATO in August 2001. On September 12, members of the alliance invoked Article 5—which says, in essence, “An attack on one is an attack on all.” President Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, remarked to Burns, “It’s good to have friends in the world.”
In our Q&A, Burns says,
We are so powerful—and I’m proud that we’re powerful, I love our country, I want us to be strong—but we often need friends in the world. If we try to go it alone, against Putin or Xi Jinping ...
Burns continues,
China is a peer power, in all senses. Russia is a peer power in the nuclear-weapons realm. But if you add our allies—the European allies and NATO, the East Asian allies—we democratic countries are stronger. We can keep the peace through deterrence. And that’s probably the most important lesson I’ve learned since I started as a lowly intern for the State Department in West Africa in 1980.
Here is Burns on Taiwan: “I do not believe that the takeover of Taiwan by the government of the People’s Republic is inevitable.” He elaborates.
Here is Burns on the war in Europe:
It’s disheartening to see the United States position itself as some kind of neutral mediator between the aggressor, Putin, and the victim, Zelensky; the aggressor, the Russian state, and the victim, the people of Ukraine. We have to be on the side of the people of Ukraine, because Putin has crossed the most important red line in global politics: You cannot go into someone else’s country and overtake it by force and get away with it—especially given Russia’s history and Soviet history over the last 100 years or so.
These days, the U.S. State Department acts like a branch of the Republican National Committee. Last month, the department issued the following pronouncement:
This Thanksgiving, we’re grateful for President Trump. Because of his bold and visionary leadership, our nation commands respect on the world stage.
Six days later, the department issued another pronouncement:
This morning, the State Department renamed the former Institute of Peace to reflect the greatest dealmaker in our nation’s history.
Welcome to the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace. The best is yet to come.
Nick Burns has served under six presidents and nine secretaries of state—Republicans and Democrats. And he knows you take an oath to the Constitution, not to a party or man. He is stirring on this subject, in our Q&A, as on all the other subjects.
Which include the U.S. Agency for International Development and our “radios”—including Radio Free Asia, which meant a lot to people in China, among other countries. Says Burns,
I don’t get it. We’re in a competition with China, and we have just basically destroyed the institutions that were helping us to compete.
At the end of our conversation, Burns puts in a word for immigration—one of the things that have “made us a great, great nation.” Nick’s paternal grandparents came from Ireland, poor as hell. Teenagers, both. Their grandson has represented America in capitals all over the world.
If I had my way, he’d be secretary of state. But his students at the Kennedy School are lucky to have him, and we in podcast-land are lucky to have him too. I could edit this podcast to make it sleek(er)—but I have left in my fumblings and ramblings and interruptions. There are technical glitches, too—some “freezing,” some inadvertent self-muting. Moreover, the podcast could be shorter, tighter.
But I am presenting it “as is,” and I will now stop typing and let you listen, when you have the time.
