Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Drake Ogilvie's avatar

Google AI’s answer to a question about a commenter’s criticism of Jay’s thinking “[we] have a right to know what our war aims are.”

GOOGLE AI:

The critique is philosophically legitimate because it raises a valid conceptual problem in the philosophy of law and ethics: whether a "right" can exist if its object is impossible, non-existent, or undefined. However, its conclusion relies on a questionable analogy.

In philosophy, rights are typically understood to correlate with duties. For a right to exist, it must be possible for someone to fulfill the corresponding obligation. The critic argues that "war aims" are often non-existent, shifting, or structurally impossible to define in real-time geopolitics. Therefore, asserting a right to know them is as empty as asserting a right to a biological impossibility like a 200-year lifespan—it is a "spherical ethical claim in a vacuum" because the object of the right does not exist in reality.

However, a defender of the original statement would argue the analogy is flawed:

• The nature of the object: A 200-year lifespan is a biological impossibility. War aims, by contrast, are a political choice. If they do not exist, it is because a government has failed to define them, not because they are inherently against the laws of nature.

• Rights as demands: In political philosophy (especially democratic theory), asserting a "right to know" is often a demand for accountability. It means the government has a moral duty to create and communicate those aims before sending citizens to war.

CynthiaW's avatar

"I was thinking about the Iran war, and thinking: you and I have a right to know what our war aims are."

Is it philosophically legitimate to assert a "right" to something that doesn't exist? I think the "right to know what our war aims are" is equivalent to a "right to a 200-year lifespan." The spherical ethical claim in a vacuum may be asserted, but there's neither this nor there to the object.

No posts

Ready for more?